The Consent of Nations
In the last century before the Common Era, the great Roman orator Cicero wrote that there is an irrefutable argument for us to believe in the existence of the gods: namely, that "there never was any nation so barbarous, nor any people in the world so savage, as to be without some notion of gods" (Tusculan Disputations (I, XIII, 30) ). Known as the argument consensus Importantly, this account both predicted and required the presence of religion among all human groups. As the Creator had given awareness of his existence to humanity, it appeared to have become theologically impossible that people without religion could exist. From the church fathers to the Renaissance, the belief in the universality of religion rested on Christian theology and its references to an imaginary consensus gentium. Much of the philological work of Renaissance humanists like Marsilio Ficino and Pico della Mirandola was fuelled by the search for a prisca theologia, a pristine theology or Urreligion that had supposedly provided the basic structure for all later religious systems (Idel 2002, Nelson Being." There were nations so barbarous and peoples so savage, these reports emphasized, as to lack all religion. Fortunately, these groups could be brushed away as savages, whose humanity was suspect. But the problem of atheism threatened to turn acute, when French missionaries were said to have found a society of atheists in an ancient civilization. It concerned China and the "Confucianism" of its educated elite. Did this doctrine know of "God" or was it atheistic? For decades, different monastic orders and the philosophes disputed the issue. Eventually, the polemics required the interference of the Sorbonne and the Papal See, which decided in favour of the view that the Confucians were atheists (Kors 1990 ).
Inadvertently, this falsified the consensus gentium argument, since a civilized elite had now joined the savages as people without religion. The Jesuit father Louis Le Comte raised a crucial question: would it not be dangerous to religion, he said, to say "that the ancient Chinese, like those of the present, were atheists?" The "Libertines" would draw great advantage from this confession that an ancient, enlightened and flourishing empire had never acknowledged the Divinity: "What would become thus of the arguments that the holy fathers, in proving the existence of God, drew from the consent of all peoples, in whom they claimed that nature had so deeply imprinted the idea of Him, that nothing could erase it?" (cited in Kors 1990:171-2).
Another Jesuit, Father Joseph Lafitau, set out to save the consensus. In the early eighteenth century, he had spent six years as a missionary among the Iroquois. In 1724, he published his massive Moeurs des sauvages Amériquains comparée aux moeurs des premiers temps, one of the first works of comparative ethnology (Pagden 1987:198-210) . Its purpose, Lafitau stated, was to establish the truth of the unanimous consent of nations in the matter of religion. With great distress, he had noted that travel narratives depicted the primitives "as people without any sentiment of religion, knowledge of a divinity or object to which they rendered any cult": Now, in this way, what argument is not furnished to atheists? One of the strongest proofs against them of the necessity and existence of a religion is the unanimous consent of all peoples in recognizing a Supreme Being and honouring him in some way, a unanimity which shows that people feel his superiority and the need of turning to him.
If one could demonstrate the existence people without religion, one gave the atheist evidence for his claim that religion was but the artifice of human legislators and powerhungry priests. Therefore, it was necessary to destroy the false idea that the Indians did not have religion: "It is then a question only of proving this unanimity of opinion among all nations, showing that, indeed, there is none so barbarous as to have no religion or sanctioned customs" (Lafitau 1974:28-9) .
Lafitau took the argument a step further. Not only do all these people whom we call barbarous have religion, he said, but it was also very similar to the religions of antiquity.
Moreover, the latter were similar to the teachings of true faith:
In this same doctrine we see a religion, pure and holy in itself and in its origin, a religion emanating from God who gave it to our first fathers. There can be, in truth, only one religion and it…must have begun with them and existed as long as they. This is what faith teaches and religion dictates to us.
Therefore, human societies could not have lived without the strong bond of religion. On the contrary, the original divine religion was "passed from generation to generation as a kind of heritage common to all and thus spread everywhere" (30-35). Theological certainty, then, left no doubt whatsoever that religion was indeed universal: "Men need a religion." The issue had been settled; the consensus saved.
Transforming Theology into Anthropology
All these arguments derived from an explicit theological consensus that awareness of the biblical God and the desire to worship Him had been ingrained in humanity. This theological framework allowed these authors to perceive and conceptualize the traditional practices of all peoples as expressions of "religion." Within this framework, even practices like "bowing down to wood and stone" reflected the deeply-rooted human property of religion. However, the discovery of peoples without religion was not just a challenge to this explicit theological claim. Over centuries, the dominance of Christianity in Europe had generated an implicit anthropology or understanding of human beings. If nations without religion existed, then this entire anthropology would require revision. This was not a question of rejecting some isolated claim like "no people is so savage as to lack religion." It would involve re-examining an entire web of beliefs about humanity, from the most basic descriptions of the "religions" of Asia and Africa to the most sophisticated speculations about human nature.
For a moment, it seemed as though the early Enlightenment would go ahead with this task and reject the belief in the universality of religion. John Locke disputed the innateness of the idea of God and pointed out the following in the fourth edition of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1700:29): "Besides the Atheists, taken notice of amongst the Ancients, and left branded upon the Records of History, hath not Navigation discovered, in these latter Ages, whole Nations…amongst whom there was to be found no Notion of a God, no Religion." Such rejections of the innateness of the notion of God gave rise to the argument among French rationalist theologians that the collective reasoning of humanity had nevertheless produced the consensus that the Supreme Being exists. In reply, Pierre Bayle argued that the universal acknowledgement of some claim could never count as proof for its truth. Besides, he added, both ancient philosophy and the atheistic Chinese civilization demonstrated that there was no such unanimous consent (Israel 2006:71-85 ).
In the long run, the effects of this denial proved negligible: throughout the eighteenth century, authors reinforced the earlier consensus. On one hand, travel reports about alien cultures continued to conceptualize the practices of peoples in Asia, Africa and the Americas as expressions of (false) religion. That is to say, they assumed as true that these people had religion. As before, the resulting descriptions depended on the theological account of religion as a universal drive to worship the divine. Enlightenment scholars were less harsh towards "heathen religion" than missionaries. Like the latter, however, they rarely raised the question as to whether all these cultures really had religion.
On the other hand, there remained travelogues that noted the absence of religion among certain "savages." Confronted by these, other authors devised a set of strategies to save the consensus from refutation. The first strategy denied humanity to the peoples without religion. One author put it as follows: "By whatsoever steps any should advance in the denial of a Deity; they should proceed by the same, to the abandoning of their own humanity; and by saying there is no God, they should proclaim themselves no men." Thus, there could be no veritable threat to "the commonness, not to say absolute universality, of Religion" (Howe 1702:28-9) . Indeed, to deny the humanity of people without religion required less effort than to rethink one's entire anthropology (Synge 1703:14-5) . At the end of the century, it was still popular to define "man by animal religiosum," rather "than animal rationale" (Charnock 1797:10). By implication, those who lacked religion also lacked humanity.
Another strategy was to suggest that travellers had made flawed observations. In 1691, the scientist Robert Boyle had instituted a lectureship in his last will and testament for the defence of the Christian faith against atheists. Several of the sermons preached in his name reproduced this argument in order to prove that religion could not arise from the invention of any "cunning and designing Person" (Bentley 1739:384). John Hancock agreed that since navigation has improved and many unknown peoples had been discovered, some had pretended to find exceptions from the general rule that no nation is so barbarous as not What we see happen in the course of the eighteenth century is the transformation of theological postulates into anthropological facts. Perhaps no texts illustrate this so strikingly as the early encyclopaedias. In a multi-volume Universal Library, Henry Curzon started the entry "Religion" with the obvious: "From the beginning of Time, there was no Nation so rude or barbarous, but did set apart some solemn or publick Places for the worship of Deities…" (Curzon 1722:46-7). In the entry "Religion, or Theology" of the third volume of the Encyclopaedia Britannica of 1771, the theology is still obviously present:
"From the first knowledge that we have of the world, that is to say, for about five thousand years past, men have blindly searched after the idea of the true God; and by the weakness of their discernment, they have fallen into a thousand errors" (Smellie 1771, vol. 3:533) . In contrast, the first American encyclopaedia from the turn of the century sounded much like today's scholarly tracts about religion. "The slightest knowledge of history is sufficient to inform us," its entry on Religion stated, "that religion has ever had a powerful influence in moulding the sentiments and manners of men…Religion seems to be congenial to the heart of man; for wherever human society subsists, there we are certain of finding religious opinions and sentiments." Its reflections could come from the pages of contemporary religious studies:
The foundation of all religion rests on the belief of the existence of one or more superior beings, who govern the world, and upon whom the happiness or misery of mankind ultimately depends…No nation or tribe has ever been found, in which there is not reason to believe that some notions were entertained of superior and invisible powers, upon which depends the happiness or misery of mankind.
Once the entry began to speculate about the origins of religion, however, its theological inheritance re-surfaced. Either "the image of Deity must be stamped on the mind of every human being, the savage as well as the sage," or the founders of societies had discovered the existence of superior beings and communicated it to their followers, or this universal belief had been derived from a primeval revelation (Anonymous 1798, vol. 16:60) .
This entry illustrates a crucial shift that would shape the study of religion for centuries to come. The apparent discovery of peoples without religion had constituted empirical anomalies with respect to a particular theory. That is, the observation that some tribes did not know of any deity, and therefore had no religion, was possible and significant only because of a specific theoretical framework operating in the background, namely generic Christian theology. In response to such anomalies, the most evident step is to immunize the theory against the empirical anomalies it confronts by making ad hoc changes.
The encyclopaedia entry embodies one such immunizing modification: redefining one of the theory's theoretical terms. Instead of defining "religion" as "belief in the Deity," "awareness of the Supreme Being," or something similar, it now spoke of "religion" as the entertaining of notions of superior and invisible powers, upon which depends the happiness of humankind. It replaced an obviously theological concept with more neutral-sounding terms of description, and hence also neutralized the empirical anomalies: after all, all human nations had some notions of superior and invisible powers.
That this constituted no fundamental change to the theoretical framework is shown by the ease with which the entry moved back and forth between the two sets of concepts: it could easily shift from the "notions of superior and invisible powers shared by all nations" to explicitly theological concepts like "the image of the Deity stamped on the human mind" and "primeval revelation." Moving from one set of concepts to the other averted the need to engage in any major rethinking of the anthropology embedded in the western common sense by this time. It could keep the basic conceptual framework stable by substituting some of its terms. The same cognitive move, we will now see, determined the conceptual framework of the twentieth-century study of religion.
The Establishment of an Anthropological Fact
The last quarter of the nineteenth century became the stage for the closing debate about the universality of religion.
5 Its instigator was the natural historian Sir John Lubbock, who published his Prehistoric Times in 1865. In a crucial passage, Lubbock (1971:574) raised the question "whether there is any race of men so degraded as to be entirely without a religion." The answer, he suggested, depends on the meaning one gives to the term "religion." If one defines it as a mere fear of the unknown or vague belief in witchcraft, then the answer is negative. But if one held a higher conception of religion, then the answer is a resounding "yes," since the most savage races never had this kind of religion. Lubbock then gave a list of observations on the absence of religion among all kinds of tribes in Africa, the Americas, and Asia. Many travellers and missionaries, he noted, had fully expected to find religion everywhere but were almost against their will convinced that the reverse was the case (1971:574-9). Because he was compelled to review all races in his teaching, de Quatrefages had looked for atheism in the lowest as well as the highest, and found it nowhere, except in certain individuals and schools of thought in modern Europe. He added his own definition of "religion" focussing on two characteristics: namely, "a belief in beings superior to man and capable of exercising a good or evil influence upon his destiny; and the conviction that the existence of man is not limited to the present life, but that there remains for him a future beyond the grave." Every human being and people possessing these characteristics is religious, he stipulated, and "observation shows more and more clearly every day the universality of this character" (Quatrefages 1890:484). Tiele (1905:6) reasoned in much the same way, when he said that inaccurate observation and the confusion of ideas had prevented some minds from realising that all nations had a "belief in any higher beings." re-defined one term within the larger framework and kept both this framework and its concomitant descriptions of the various "religions" of humanity stable. Eventually, this allowed them to conclude that there were no peoples without religion. Cognitively speaking, this move was economic, but it also came with a heavy price: that of accepting theological claims as theory-neutral anthropological facts.
Let us illustrate this historically. When Lafitau or More addressed the question as to whether all human groups had religion, the nature of this object of religion was clear to them: religion was the awareness of God's existence given by Him to humanity (and all too often corrupted later). Because of the absolute theological certainty that religion existed everywhere, European travellers saw its presence in all kinds of practices, stories, and texts they encountered in other parts of the world. A variety of terms from Asian and African traditions were translated as "God" or "Supreme Being" or "Deity," since it was indubitable that these people had some awareness of the biblical God. If no plausible equivalent was found, scholars stipulated that among the people in question the instinctive awareness of God had degenerated into spirit worship or something else. In short, a specific theoretical framework provided one with conceptual criteria to confirm the presence or absence of religion among certain alien cultures and gave structure to the resulting descriptions of these cultures.
What would happen, if this theological framework were to shift into the background and its doctrinal issues were transformed into anthropological questions? Suddenly, one no longer possessed the theological account about the original religion to establish its universality. At the same time, this framework had not been replaced with any new theory that identified the structure and properties of the object of religion. In other words, one lacked criteria to test its presence or absence in any given society. All one had left, were the term "religion," certain commonsense notions about the object it referred to, and a whole body of descriptions of the "religions" of non-western cultures, all inherited from more than fifteen centuries of Christian theorizing.
These, I would like to suggest, were the conditions under which Tylor, Tiele, and their contemporaries approached the issue at hand. They no longer said that all human beings had a sense of the biblical God, for this was an explicitly theological claim. But they
were even less open to challenging the belief in the cultural universality of religion, since this piece of theology had been ingrained in the western common sense. As in previous centuries, the "fact" of universality was restored through repetition. Instead of the great orator, the historian (Tiele) and the anthropologist (de Quatrefages) became the experts who had established this once and for all. 
Curing the Incurable?
From the foregoing, we can conclude that a genuine scientific debate about the cultural universality of religion never occurred in western scholarship, because the terms of description and debate had been set by a theological background framework. A constitutive element of this framework was the presupposition that all nations had some form of religion. Over decades and centuries, the dominant descriptions of the presumed "religions"
of Asia, Africa and the Americas were purged of their explicitly theological content. More empirical anomalies were pointed out: scholars showed that belief and doctrine were not central in some religions; others pointed out that many religions had no creeds, sacred scriptures, ecclesiastical structures, or organized modes of worship. In response to such anomalies, new ad hoc modifications also followed: the term "religion" and its cognates became increasingly more "flexible" as the term was defined in more encompassing ways. It was added that there were different kinds of religion and that we should not map all religions on the model of Christianity. Nonetheless, the basic conceptual structure of the descriptions of non-western religions remained in place. This can be inferred from the fact that western scholars and laymen continued to speak and write of "Hinduism," "Buddhism,"
"Bantu religion," "Hopi religion" ... as though it was self-evident that such entities existed.
For those non-western peoples concerning whom agreement had emerged at some point in the history of western scholarship that they did have religion, this agreement was not to be disputed again.
It is here that a new challenge has emerged, which is of a fundamentally different kind than the past disputes about the universality of religion. We shall draw on the work of Balagangadhara (1994) to explain this challenge because he formulates it in unambiguous terms. First of all, Balagangadhara questions the factual status of the descriptions of the "religions" of Asia. The entities of "Hinduism," "Buddhism," "Jainism," "Sikhism"… crystallized within the framework of a secularized Christian theology. Occurring within this framework, the everyday observations of European travellers and the systematic reflections of orientalist scholars concurred in gradually creating such conceptual entities or coherent patterns of description. In the process, texts reflecting on the nature of the self and human experience were transformed into "doctrines about God." Rituals and practices were systematically re-described as the "worship" of gods, ancestors or other spiritual beings.
Traditional stories and legal treatises were taken as representations of the "religious beliefs"
of a people. The resulting descriptive entities were the "religions" of India. Thus, the "Hindu, Buddhist, Jain and Sikh religions" came into being not as theory-neutral facts but as descriptions informed at every level by a cultural background framework of generic Christian theology.
Second, Balagangadhara (2010:136-9) argues that the conceptual patterns of entities like "Hinduism" or "Taoism" do not correspond to patterns present in the relevant peoples' experiences of their own traditions and practices. These religions do not exist in the cultures where they are supposed to. They are fictitious entities. When religious entities like "Hinduism" are postulated, the resulting descriptions may make sense to Western scholars and laymen, but they are inaccessible to the people described. Balagangadhara (1994:318-423 ) goes further. He develops an alternative theory of religion, which explains why Western culture was compelled to see religion in all other cultures, and then traces the empirical consequences of this theory to demonstrate that there can be no "indigenous" religion in Indian culture. Consequently, religion is emphatically not a cultural universal.
There is no need to go into these arguments here in order to appreciate the challenge that Balagangadhara puts before the contemporary study of religion: Which are the theoretical or empirical criteria that allow us to test and demonstrate the presence of religion in some culture, without already presupposing that this culture has religion? To define "religion" in some encompassing way and suggest that it exists wherever there is belief in "spiritual beings" or "supernatural agency" is to evade this issue. The problem is not that of finding terms, definitions and descriptions sufficiently vague to encompass all entities that we believe to be religions. Instead, we are challenged to re-examine the extant case does not count as evidence for its truth. Otherwise our recurrent perception that the sun revolves around the earth would have to count as evidence for the truth of geocentric models of the universe. Second, in so far as there is (or was) a scholarly consensus that religion is universal across human societies, this rests on the conclusion reached in the early twentieth-century debate on peoples without religion. But that conclusion, we saw, reproduced the earlier theological consensus with suitable ad hoc modifications. Thus, the first challenge posed by Balagangadhara to these explanations of religion is that they have to demonstrate the truth of their explanandum. If they cannot, then these explanations will turn out to be exercises in the fallacy of petitio principii (presupposing what one has to prove).
The other major challenge lies in the fact that the evolutionary-biological explanations of religion have accepted the dominant descriptions of the presumed "religions" of humanity as theory-neutral facts in need of explanation. In doing so, they ignore that many of these descriptions rely on (and hence reproduce) a conceptual framework and theoretical terms of Christian-theological stock. Let us briefly illustrate this.
In his work on the evolutionary landscape of religion, Scott Atran (2002:52) states the following "fact" as self-evident:
In all religions, and thus in all societies, people believe that agents unseen have intentionally generated the world we see. God created the world for us on purpose and knows what is true. Given that people believe in truthful and purposive supernatural agents, they are able to sanctify the moral order and hold the group to commitment (italics added).
This claim is problematic. It is untrue that in all societies, people believe that invisible agents have intentionally generated the visible world. In some cultures, the various accounts of the origin of the world conceive of the world as the unintentional result of some sequence of events or acts. In the Indian traditions, for instance, there are several such accounts; Jains even deny any possibility of a creation of the universe or creator god (Balagangadhara 1994:398-412 ). Yet, Atran (2002:53) insists that all societies explain the world in terms of "the supernatural establishment of order from the midst of primordial chaos. The order that is established derives from the thoughts and intentions of divine beings." He gives the following example: "In Hindu religious iconography, Vishnu is often represented dreaming the world, as he hovers over the Milky Way while lying on the serpent Ananta ("Unending")." To this account, however, the Hindu traditions add dozens of other accounts about the coming into being of the world. Many of these do not explain it in terms of the thoughts and intentions of divine beings. In fact, even Vishnu's creation of the world happens through "līlā" or "play" and not through an act of creation that expresses his intentions.
How has Atran come to such generic but false statements about all societies? His facts derive from the way in which Christian-theological reflection has systematically conceptualized the "religions" and "gods" of non-western cultures over the centuries. The idea that the deities of all such religions were taken by their followers to be invisible agents who intentionally created and governed the world was central to the concept of "false religion." In true religion, it was said, believers knew that the true God was the sole creator and sovereign of the universe, whose divine will governed all that was. In contrast, the followers of false religion did not realize this and mistakenly attributed the capacity to rule the world to certain creatures and worshipped these as divine beings. According to this theological explanation, these gods were false (among other reasons) because it was wrongly believed that their intentions governed the world and caused its events. This was essential to the theological notion of "false gods." This notion gave structure to early modern European conceptions of non-western "religions," which systematically described their "gods" or "deities" as intentional agents whose purposes are supposedly expressed in natural events (David Hume's Natural History of Religion (1757) is a well-known example).
While Atran renounces the terminology of "false gods," he reproduces this notion by arguing that, in all religions and societies, people believe that agents unseen have intentionally generated the visible world. He is not alone here. Other authors of biological explanations of religion similarly give great importance to the "fact" that people in all religions believe that natural events are caused by the intentional agency of supernatural beings (Barrett 2000 :31, Boyer 2001 :144-8, Dennett 2006 . They explain this as the byproduct of an adaptive capacity of human perception to detect intentional or human-like agency in the environment. Without going into the cognitive value of this explanation, we should note here that such factual claims about humanity's "religions" and their "supernatural beings" need to be re-examined before they could even serve as facts in need of explanation. This is the case because these "facts" stem from descriptions of these "religions" that are structured by a theological conceptual apparatus.
Most importantly, this is true for the belief that the religions of Asia, Africa and the Americas exist in the first place. The most basic descriptive layer of our descriptions of these "religions" had emerged from the consensus gentium. All later descriptions built on the presumption that these religions existed and thus also continued the Christian-theological consensus. Consequently, the evolutionary theorists of religion fail to realize to what extent the descriptions of their data have been shaped by a particular theoretical framework, namely, that of generic Christian theology.
Conclusion
Given that the debate on the cultural universality of religion has been reopened, the contemporary study of religion is in a unique position to settle this issue on reasonable theoretical grounds. If Balagangadhara is right, then religion is not a cultural universal and many of the "religions" that have been attributed to humanity will prove to be non-existent.
If the evolutionary-biological theorists of religion are right, however, then religion must be a cultural universal and some form of religion should have existed among all human peoples.
This essay has traced the historical development of the debate on the universality of religion in order to explain the issues at stake. When the scientific study of other cultures took off in the early twentieth century, it did not begin in a vacuum. Western scholars presupposed the claim that Christian thinkers had "established" and "re-established" much before them: religion is a cultural universal. That is to say, they did not empirically find out whether there were religions in the many communities and societies of Asia, Africa or the Americas. They reproduced the belief in the existence of multiple religions, accepted the basic descriptions of these "religions" that had circulated for centuries, and assumed too that they were describing various aspects of such entities when they did their fieldwork and historiography. They assumed all of this without any genuine empirical or theoretical support.
When the evolutionary theorists of the twenty-first century appeal to the work of earlier scholars to assert the universality of religion, they are not giving any other evidence except what people in the West have believed to be the case for centuries. It is time for us to realize that something strange has happened. With appropriate modifications, the Christian theologian's claim of consensus gentium has ensconced itself in western common sense in the form of the widespread intuition that religion is universal across all human societies. Many contemporary theorists of religion take this intuition as a given. "There is an innate sense of divinity in men" says one; "yes, but in the form of memes or genes," says the other. If we really intend our study of religion to be scientific, then we shall have to critically re-examine the facts inherited from fifteen centuries of Christian-theological reflection about humanity.
